Identity, credentials, and synthetic profiles
Separate identity proofing from login security and account behavior.
A document looks real. The selfie looks real. The person behind the application may still be using someone else’s identity. Identity evidence is a collection of claims to test, not a single green badge that lasts forever.
Resolve the person behind the claim
Identity proofing establishes confidence in a claimed identity. Authentication establishes confidence that an actor controls an authenticator. Authorization determines what that actor may do. Keep these concepts separate in the data model. A valid password cannot repair weak onboarding evidence.
Use multiple evidence types that answer different questions: does the identity exist, is the evidence valid, and does the applicant connect to it? Correlated checks add less confidence than they appear to. Two vendors may rely on the same underlying database. Record provenance and limitations, not just a final score. A rejected applicant also needs an accessible route to correct an error.
Identity work starts with the claim the product needs to establish. A low-risk account lookup, a new credit relationship, and a change to payout ownership do not necessarily require the same evidence. Collecting the maximum possible data for every interaction can increase privacy exposure and create a larger pool of sensitive material without resolving the real uncertainty.
Lantern can separate evidence into observed facts, provider assertions, and internal conclusions. An observed document image is not the same as a provider’s authenticity result, and neither is identical to the platform’s decision to permit an action. Recording the distinction allows the platform to revisit a conclusion when evidence expires or a provider reports an error. It also prevents a downstream team from treating a convenient boolean as proof of everything about a person.
- ResolveIdentify the claimed person
- ValidateCheck the supporting evidence
- VerifyConnect the applicant to that evidence
- Proofing
- Confidence in an identity claim
- Authentication
- Confidence in control of an authenticator
Identity review specimen
Illustrative data; not a real customer record or a prescribed policy.
- Documentvalidated
Evidence appears valid
- Applicant linkunresolved
Possession is not yet established
- Actionassisted review
Accessible alternative route
The checks establish different facts
Preserve separate proofing and authentication states. The checks establish different facts.
- Failure mode 1avoid
- Treat login success as full identity proof. Credential control does not establish identity.
- Failure mode 2avoid
- Count two shared-data vendors as independent. Their errors may be correlated.
- Failure mode 3avoid
- Reject without correction route. Evidence errors can harm legitimate applicants.
Synthetic identity is a lifecycle problem
A synthetic profile combines identity elements into a constructed persona. Some elements can be genuine. A profile may build a long history before creating a large unpaid obligation. The useful signal is often inconsistency across time and relationships, not a single obviously false document.
Use an evidence graph that records when each name, address, device, account, and contact appeared. Shared attributes are leads, not verdicts: families and workplaces share infrastructure. Test whether the pattern is inconsistent with the claimed relationship. Preserve uncertainty in the case record so an analyst does not inherit a suspicion as an established fact.
- ObserveCollect time-stamped identity claims
- ConnectFind relevant shared attributes
- EvaluateTest the claimed relationships
- Shared attribute
- A possible relationship
- Confirmed abuse
- Evidence supports a harmful pattern
Constructed-profile review
Illustrative data; not a real customer record or a prescribed policy.
- Addressshared by 12 applicants
Could have legitimate causes
- Deviceshared application history
Investigative lead
- Income historyinconsistent
Needs independent support
Shared data alone is not proof
Investigate inconsistent relationships with context. Shared data alone is not proof.
- Failure mode 1avoid
- Ban every shared address. Households and buildings create legitimate overlap.
- Failure mode 2avoid
- Ignore a mature account. Age does not prove legitimacy.
- Failure mode 3avoid
- Label all linked people as criminals. That exceeds the evidence.
Evidence freshness changes meaning
An identity check describes what was established at a point in time. Contact details, documents, account control, and business ownership can change. Define refresh triggers according to the product and applicable duties. A high-risk destination change may justify a different action from an ordinary email typo correction.
Store observed_at, verified_at, source, and expiry separately. An event received today may describe information from last year. If a vendor returns an old record, the application should not label it newly verified merely because the API call was recent. Make stale evidence visible in the decision record and test the fallback behavior.
- ObserveRecord source event time
- AssessCompare freshness to the use
- RefreshObtain evidence when justified
- Received today
- New delivery timestamp
- Current evidence
- Information remains fit for this decision
Freshness specimen
Illustrative data; not a real customer record or a prescribed policy.
- Vendor responseSeptember 17
Delivery date
- Source recordJanuary 4
Underlying observation
- Decisionrefresh required
Illustrative product rule
A fresh API call can return stale evidence
Track source age as well as response time. A fresh API call can return stale evidence.
- Failure mode 1avoid
- Use response time as proof date. That confuses delivery with observation.
- Failure mode 2avoid
- Discard every old record. Some historical facts remain useful.
- Failure mode 3avoid
- Refresh only after a loss. The control may be needed before exposure.
Design for legitimate exceptions
Names change, documents expire, cameras fail, and people do not all have the same records. A proofing system that works only for a narrow population can reject honest customers at scale. Measure completion and error patterns across relevant groups using approved data and privacy controls.
Provide a secure alternative route for cases the standard flow cannot resolve. The alternative should maintain the needed assurance while reducing the specific barrier. Do not lower every control because one vendor fails. Compare assisted outcomes with automated outcomes to find recurring defects in document handling, transliteration, or accessibility.
A legitimate person may have an old address, a changed name, limited credit history, or a document that an automated reader handles poorly. These cases create uncertainty, not automatic proof of fraud. A proportionate exception path offers other relevant evidence and a trained review process. Measure how often customers enter that path, how long resolution takes, and whether the eventual outcome supports the initial concern. Otherwise, the apparent accuracy of the automated flow may come from quietly excluding the people it understands least well.
- FailIdentify the exact evidence barrier
- AssistOffer an approved alternate method
- LearnReview recurring failure patterns
- Alternative method
- Different evidence with suitable assurance
- Uncontrolled bypass
- No evidence for the required claim
Assisted review record
Illustrative data; not a real customer record or a prescribed policy.
- Barriercamera cannot focus
Capture problem
- Alternativeapproved assisted capture
Same assurance objective
- Outcomeidentity resolved
Document the evidence used
Accessibility and assurance can be designed together
Offer a controlled alternative. Accessibility and assurance can be designed together.
- Failure mode 1avoid
- Approve anyone who complains. Pressure is not evidence.
- Failure mode 2avoid
- Permanently reject every capture error. Technical failure does not prove false identity.
- Failure mode 3avoid
- Ask for unrelated sensitive data. More data does not necessarily solve the barrier.
Minimize identity data exposure
Identity records can cause lasting harm if exposed. Keep raw evidence in a restricted store, use references in downstream systems, and log access. Limit exports and redact support views. Data needed for proofing does not belong in every analytics table.
Map retention to purpose, applicable requirements, and approved policy. Deleting an account should trigger a defined retention workflow rather than uncontrolled deletion of all evidence or indefinite retention of everything. Test restoration and backup behavior too. A record removed from the main application may still exist in exports, caches, and test environments.
- CollectUse purpose-limited evidence
- RestrictSeparate raw records from references
- RetainApply the approved lifecycle
- Token reference
- Links a decision to protected evidence
- Raw document copy
- Contains directly identifying information
Access boundary record
Illustrative data; not a real customer record or a prescribed policy.
- Risk eventidentity-ref-19
Reference only
- Evidence vaultrestricted
Raw records stay here
- Support viewredacted
Minimum data for the task
Most consumers need a result rather than a document
Use restricted evidence storage and references. Most consumers need a result rather than a document.
- Failure mode 1avoid
- Copy documents into every log. That spreads sensitive data.
- Failure mode 2avoid
- Keep all exports forever. Retention needs a defined purpose and rule.
- Failure mode 3avoid
- Use production identities in test fixtures. Test systems do not need real customer documents.
Chapter connections
Continue with Account takeover and account recovery to follow the next part of the system. Use the glossary for terminology and risk mathematics for formulas and worked calculations.